

CONFIDENTIAL

COMPT. 74-0866

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500090001-2

USIB
Information Handling Committee:
Some Cultural Notes

25X1 1. IHC roots go back to the mid-fifties, beginning with
25X1 AHIP (the Ad Hoc Information Processing committee of the
USIB predecessor, Intelligence Advisory Committee [IAC]).
AHIP, I believe, was suggested by the Army. It was chaired
by [] Deputy Director of the DDI/Office of Collection
and Dissemination (OCD), later Office of Central Reference
(OCR), now Central Reference Service (CRS). Its secretary
was [] then a branch chief in the CIA Library.

2. The rationale for AHIP was the growing volume of
intelligence reporting, the proliferation of indexing and
other control systems, increasing people and (probable)
technology costs and the unstructured feeling that some kinds
of Community standards were desirable. A Community Intelli-
gence Subject Code (ISC) was developed and implemented; a
common human source report numbering system was devised for
machine control, internally meaningful as to report number,
date and reporting agency; a common report format was
eventually developed for input to microstorage document-
handling systems; and several other procedural efforts were
launched.

3. CIA was in the forefront of the technology, having
developed an approach toward machine control over inherited
OSS files, which culminated in the Intellofax System (an EAM-
supported, microphotographed document collection with relevant
bibliographic information typed in clear text on the IBM
punched aperture card in which the microfilm was mounted and
from which, through facsimile reproduction on photo-sensitized
paper tape, a bibliography of documents relevant to a given
subject/area query could be constituted). The CIA-developed
ISC was the most sophisticated indexing system around, and
the OCD/OCR professionals ranked very highly in the professional
societies.

4. In about 1957, Paul Borel and [] took over 25X1
the management of OCR (the name change coming from the Hoover
Commission recommendations) and Community information proces-
sing developments were pursued with great vigor. Borel formed
a dozen task forces to look at all aspects of information
handling within OCD/OCR. He produced several papers suggesting
that much greater understanding was required of the potential
offered by computer technology (one large segment of OCD's

HS/HC-896

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500090001-2

CONFIDENTIAL

COMPT. 74-0866
RECORD COPY

25X1

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500090001-2

25X1 Special Register had broken off early on to join others to form what subsequently became NPIC), and sent his Special Assistant [] (former CIA Librarian) to graduate school in California to learn about automatic data processing and to establish contact with RAND, SRI, SDC and others on the Coast. Joe also served as Secretary of the AHIP successor, CODIAC (Committee on Documentation of the IAC), a permanent Community body.

25X1 5. [] special interests were machine translation and microphotography. The latter interest led to confrontation with [] on the DDP Walnut System (another CIA pioneer effort with IBM) over the mechanical problems in dealing with microfilm reductions on the order of 40: 1. [] was subsequently proven correct, but the acrimony wasn't dissipated until both [] and [] were gone. On the Community front, Air Force had adopted the Eastman-Kodak (John Kuipers') developed Minicard System for its collection of human source reports. Considerable logic suggested that the Community adopt the system and, under [] overview, CIA installed a Minicard System in parallel with Intellofax for an expensive and quite exhaustive examination of both systems. The CIA conclusion was that Minicard was not sufficiently competitive to warrant the expense of replacing Intellofax, although it did represent a sophisticated technological development. The Air Force never did understand that decision; they installed a second system at SAC. Some purely mechanical/people problems also were determining in deciding against a shared approach toward document indexing (i.e., CIA to code its reports, Air Force/Army/State theirs and exchange indexed reports to avoid multiple handling [Navy never really did want to play--even on common format, legal size reports being too big for safes on ships]).

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1 6. By 1960, the military services and CIA were well into evolving computer technology--all systems developments independent of the others--and Borel as Chairman/CODIB decided that a Community system-of-systems study was in order. SAC, under a project numbered 438L with GE, then IBM as contractor, had begun developing an "all-source" document handling system, including computer supported information Minicard ISC-indexed files supporting reconnaissance photography. CIA was invited to send a member to SAC as part of a Community advisory/liaison group and [] an economic analyst was designated. The Army (ACSI) was working on another document storage and retrieval system (ACSIMATIC), with RCA (including Doug Climenson and Bill Bloom now of OJCS) as contractor. The Navy, outside

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500090001-2

of the CODIB sphere, was working on the NTDS (Naval Tactical Data System) and other computer-supported systems. Borel took CODIB on a 10-day (Fairways DC-3!) trip to the West Coast, visiting SAC, several electronics companies, RAND/SRI/SDC, the NTDS facility at San Diego, and Army's Fort Huachuca; other trips included the Air Force S&T-oriented center at Dayton; MIT, Itek and the Boston complex. He then constituted the SCIPS (CODIB/Staff for the Information Processing Study) Group, under [] as Director, with about a dozen CIA members and another dozen representatives from the USIB-member agencies plus 2-3 contractors from A.D. Little and, I believe, Itek.

25X1

7. CODIB member morale and common problem-solving efforts were at an all-time high. The Air Force had civilians Jack Kennedy and Jack Toler of AFCIN/AFNIN--both deeply involved in the 438L/465L/UNIFILE efforts; the Army--John Kulgren, civilian honcho of the ACSIMATIC system; NSA had [] head of their Office of Central Reference and one of Borel's strongest supporters; the Navy had Capt. Don []; State had Ben Fisher, a non-FSO systems analyst who subsequently went with SDC; DOD/DDR&E was added, with Bob Dailey, Harold Brown's Deputy for Reconnaissance Systems and Dr. Ruth Davis as his deputy. The FBI and AEC were quite inactive. Consultants included Dr. Burt Adkinson of the National Academy of Sciences and Dick See of the National Science Foundation.

25X1

8. The SCIPS study ran over a year and ended in a 7-volume report consisting only of Phase I: an inventory of Community information handling resources, procedures, flow patterns, etc., and recommendations for Phase II: system-of-systems design. To aid in manipulation and analysis of the volume of data collected, all was machine processed for computer reporting.

9. The esprit evident when SCIPS began was gone by the time it ended. The generals and admirals didn't want to delay their systems developments. The MacNamara "Blue Ribbon Panel" led to the establishment of DIA and to the decision that DIA would be the focus for all DOD (not just intelligence) ADP-supported information systems development. The SCIPS study recommended that, in view of the significant resource involvement in information handling, the DCI needed a systems analysis staff of considerable size. At this point in history, few agencies had ADP programmers or systems analysts on their staffs--all were dependent on

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500090001-2

on contractors; therefore, no agency wanted to loan its limited ADP personnel to a permanent DCI staff. It had been hard enough keeping the SCIPS group of 1-2 each per agency at full strength.

25X1 10. The new DIA CODIB member [redacted] rejected the SCIPS recommendations, saying that DIA needed help in deciding what to do with the inherited Air Force 438L, Army ACSIMATIC, Navy/ONI biographic and several NSA systems. Borel asked for a "Panel of Experts" to give an unbiased assessment of the SCIPS Study; those involved included Dr. Bill Baker (PFIAB), Will Fazar (BOB, designer of PERT with Admiral Raborn), John Griffith (IBM) and Jack Kennedy (having left Air Force early in the SCIPS beginning for IDA). The Panel were unreservedly in support of the Report's conclusions. CODIB and the Panel retired [redacted] for a no-holds-barred session and the DIA position carried. Some 8-10 task forces were constituted to address a series of specific DIA problems.

25X1 11. It might be noted here that OCD/OCR had always occupied the lowest hierarchical rung on the DDI ladder. As long as it wasn't too troublesome, the AD/OCR was left alone. There was no DDS&T, the DDS wasn't really involved and the DDP Walnut System was outside of the intelligence information storage and retrieval world, so Borel didn't bother much to coordinate CODIB matters. But the implications of the SCIPS study and of the DIA-proposed task forces were significant to intelligence production. They tended to tie together collection systems and processing of that which was collected. They called for improvements in the process of producing national intelligence estimates. They called for much more attention to Community file formats and data standards. Etc. Agency officials began to take a dimmer and dimmer view of CODIB and Borel.

12. To keep momentum going on the Community front, and, as he said, to "retain at least half-a-loaf," Borel agreed to the DIA task force approach. The consultant panel was very upset and Baker, in an attempt to salvage something from the Report, called for a series of briefings on the individual agencies' level of technological development in information processing. His stated interests in what he wanted at the briefing were sufficiently garbled that CIA briefed on its newly evolving CHIVE project and not its operational systems (machine-supported since 1948);

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500090001-2

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500090001-2

25X1 [] of DIA repeated his problem of inherited Service
25X1 systems; State [] having transferred there) had
nothing to brief on but a concept and a need; NSA had the
RYE/TIPS system--so Baker, assuming that NSA was farthest
along, got the President to charge the DCI with what became
COINS, based on the RYE/TIPS model.

13. DDI analysts had been oversold by [] on the
liklihood of machine translation, had been bothered a good
bit during the SCIPS study and had really gotten a dose of
information processing during CHIVE's evolution. When
information retrieval technology interests overtook CHIVE's
improved document retrieval capabilities (and with the
beginning of the personnel reduction in 1966), disenchant-
ment set in and CIA management interest in CODIB waned
steadily. Besides, Becker had come back in about 1962 to
launch CHIVE and a DDI systems staff, which was subsequently
transferred to the DDS and combined with the Management
Staff, then in 1963 his group became the Office of Computer
Services in the new DDS&T. Borel had been moved up by Ray
Cline as Assistant DDI, endorsed the Becker move to DDS.
But, later, Cline and Dr. Wheelon, DDS&T, had many differences,
one of which revolved around the OCS pitch (pushed mostly by
Becker's deputy [] for centralization of all Agency
computer support in OCS. Emotion was running very high in
the DDP, DDI, and DDS&T computer shops. [] resigned;
25X1 [] resigned; later Becker resigned. Borel was down-
graded by Jack Smith as DDI and retired after transferring
to FBIS.

14. Also in 1966, Borel was replaced as Chairman,
CODIB by [] then of DIA. CODIB was
renamed the IHC and efforts continued on the DIA problem
areas (common file formats for information exchange; R&D;
support to NIE production; indications and warning support).
NSA strongly resented DIA's role and impact. [] was
not an information specialist and, although he tried, he
never really accomplished much in the IHC. CIA was hostile
to Community developments, both because of growing resource
problems and because of strong differences on the need for
the design efforts proposed as crucial by the DOD. And
over it all hangs COINS as a continuing irritant.

15. Which pretty much brings us to today. Baker
faulted Helms throughout for not picking up the management
ball in this field. He tried at one point to force action
by constituting the Knox Panel of the PFIAB (with Tony
Oettinger, Griffith, De Sola Poole and another 1/2 dozen
luminaries in the field) to study the Community's informa-
tion handling. The report was so intemperate that it was

5
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500090001-2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500090001-2

25X1 never released. The Community felt that CIA had files it didn't want anyone else to see and used "security" as an excuse to stay out of Community communication network design. [] and I had considerable frustration as CIA IHC members trying to find some positive role in a two-way hostile environment. The arguments for major IHC focus on DOD systems improvements to realize major resource gain under a DCI umbrella which I have touted continuously do, I think, still make sense. But the much increased Presidential charge to the DCI to be the Community manager does tend to vindicate earlier DIA/NSA IHC member criticisms of DCI absence of real involvement, particularly since they now hear him say (paraphrased): if collection was the primary focus of the past decade, processing and production are of the next.

16. Although information processing is integral to all other aspects of intelligence activity and could be subsumed in each USIB committee without continuing as a separate committee, I'm afraid it's still premature to abolish the IHC. There are major issues coming which are both political and technical (like shared files and the communication/computer links thereto; or the blurring line between tactical and strategic intelligence and the furnishing of intelligence in crisis management situations]. I would at least suggest a new look at the IHC players--their perspective is broader than ADP, or Commo, or requirements alone, but includes those three.

25X1



6
Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500090001-2

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP					
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS		DATE	INITIALS	
1	Mr. Walt Elder, 7C31				
2					
3					
4					
5					
6					
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	
Remarks: <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 15px; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> recently wrote up a historical account of the Information Handling Committee, as he remembers it, which he provided the Office of the Comptroller. I thought you would appreciate a copy for your own background information, and it is attached herewith.					
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER					
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.				DATE	
C/OC, O/Compt, 4E12 Hqs. Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500090001-2				15 Oct 74	
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	

SECRET (When Filled In)

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500090001-2		000500090001-2		DOCUMENT
AREA OR COUNTRY(S)	USIB, CRS	Information Handling		DATE: 1974
HQ				
				CLASS.: C
				NO.:
IDENTIFICATION OF DOCUMENT (author, form, addressee, title & length)				LOCATION:
"USIB Information Handling Committee: Some Cultural Notes"				HS/HC 896
6 pages.				

ABSTRACT

Historical account of the Information Handling Committee from its beginning in the mid-fifties until the present.

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500090001-2

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP84-00499R000500090001-2